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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1056 
___________ 
 
GEORGE C. JOHNSON, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY; JANE DOE 1-10; JOHN DOE 1-10; NJ DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES; ALISHA GRIFFIN; MONMOUTH CTY DIVISION OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES; JOHN BOYLE; MONMOUTH CTY PROBATION DEPARTMENT;  
CEE OKUZU; KAREN SAUNDERS, Deceased, PATRICK DOYLE, also known as 
John Doe 1 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-01528) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel A. Pisano 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
 Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 31, 2012 
Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 14, 2012) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 George Johnson appeals pro se from the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey’s order dismissing his complaint.  Because this appeal does not 
present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 
3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 In March 2011, Johnson filed a complaint in District Court concerning a support 
debt obligation of $38,954.14.  Johnson asserted that he actually owed only $19,477.07, 
possibly due to the death of his children’s mother.  In an amended complaint that he filed 
on April 25, 2011, Johnson asserted that his claims were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
and that, in November 2010, the “defendants negligently by Administrative Offset and 
federal tax refund offset, continue to state and take an incorrect and unlawful amount by 
withholding.  As a result of Defendants [sic] actions, it deprives plaintiff under color of 
law and is disobedience to the United States Constitution.”   
   Each of the named defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), and on December 6, 2011, the District Court 
entered an order granting the defendants’ motions.1
                                              
1 The District Court also denied Johnson’s motions to vacate arrears, for admissions, and 
to file a late notice of claim. 
  The District Court explained that, to 
the extent that Johnson was challenging a state court order of support, any such claim was 
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 
(1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  Further, 
the District Court determined that Johnson’s federal claims were barred under the 
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doctrine of sovereign immunity, and that, to the extent Johnson attempted to pursue 
common law negligence claims, they were time-barred under the New Jersey Tort Claims 
Act (“NJTCA”).  
 Johnson now appeals. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary 
review over a dismissal of a complaint.  Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder-Strauss Assoc., 
640 F.3d 72, 75 (3d Cir. 2011).  Because Johnson is proceeding pro se, we construe his 
filings liberally.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 
 We agree with the District Court’s analysis and decision to dismiss Johnson’s 
federal claims under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 2
                                              
2 Because we are affirming the District Court’s order on this basis, it is unnecessary to 
consider whether Johnson’s claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
  See Haybarger v. Lawrence 
Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that we engage in 
plenary review over Eleventh Amendment immunity determinations).  The defendants 
named in Johnson’s complaint included the United States of America, the United States 
Treasury Department, and several New Jersey state agencies and employees thereof.  The 
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a state or state agency 
from a suit brought in federal court regardless of the relief sought, unless Congress 
specifically abrogates the state’s immunity or the state waives its own immunity.  MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503-04 (3d Cir. 2001); Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).  Section 1983 does not abrogate states’ immunity.  
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Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1979).  Further, “[i]ndividual state employees 
sued in their official capacity are also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. . . .”  
Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010).   Neither the 
State of New Jersey nor its agencies or employees have consented to suit or waived their 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.  The District Court thus properly dismissed the federal 
claims brought against these defendants.  Similarly, the United States and the United 
States Treasury Department are also immune from suit, as Congress has not expressly 
articulated an exception to their immunity.  See Becton Dickinson & Co. v. 
Wolckenhauer, 215 F.3d 340, 345-46 (3d Cir. 2000).3
 Johnson also sued the Treasury Department, challenging its decision regarding a 
tax refund offset pursuant to the Treasury Offset Program.  Under the Treasury Offset 
Program, the Treasury Department has authority to, among other things, collect 
delinquent non-tax debts and disburse federal payments (such as tax refunds) to certain 
state agencies.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6402.  The District Court correctly determined that the 
Treasury Department’s actions with respect to an offset are not subject to judicial review 
and accordingly dismissed the claim.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6402(g); 31 C.F.R. § 285.3(i). 
   
 Finally, the District Court properly dismissed any common law negligence claims 
on the ground that Johnson failed to serve a timely notice of claim under the NJTCA.  
See generally N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:8-3; Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 
                                              
3 We note that the District Court appropriately dismissed Johnson’s claims against the 
unnamed defendants based on its dismissal of all claims against the named defendants.  
See Hindes v. F.D.I.C., 137 F.3d 148, 159 (3d Cir. 1998).  
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F.3d 159, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2006).  Under the NJTCA, a plaintiff must file a notice of 
claim against “a public entity or public employee” within ninety days of the accrual of 
that claim.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:8-8.  If the plaintiff fails to file a timely notice of claim, 
he or she is “forever barred” from asserting the cause of action unless, among other 
things, he or she demonstrates that “extraordinary circumstances” prevented him or her 
from timely filing the notice of claim.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:8-8, -9.  Here, the District 
Court correctly dismissed Johnson’s negligence claims under the NJTCA after 
concluding that the notice of claim was untimely and that Johnson failed to demonstrate 
that the delay was due to “extraordinary circumstances.”  
 For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents “no substantial question,” 
and will therefore summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. LAR 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.     
 
